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Richard A Mould∗
State University of New York, Stony Brook, N.Y.
Abstract
It is claimed elsewhere that the conscious states of humans must have
evolved together with their biological states, and that an ongoing interac-
tion between the two must have occurred to insure that they mirror one
another in any species. A quantum mechanical mechanism and an evo-
lutionary model for the assumed mind/body interaction are described in
those papers. The present paper outlines the related ontological and epis-
temological assumptions, showing how the claimed connection between
conscious states and physical states should be understood.
Part I
My basic ontological assumption is that the universe is monistic. It is a fully
unified whole that includes all that we call objective reality, and all that we call
subjective reality, where there is no fundamental distinction between the two
at this level. Moreover, I assume that there are no differences that are of fun-
damental or intrinsic importance to the monistic universe. There are of course
differences, accounting for the great variety of things that we experience. Among
these we find ‘significant’ differences, accounting for the fact that some become
our guideposts for the rest. We find conserved quantities, (i.e., things that re-
main unchanged in time), and invariant quantities (i.e., things that remain the
same under various kinds of displacement or transformation), and these become
the constants that stabilize our lives. However, I do not think there is anything
special about these quantities in the underlying monistic universe. They are
special only to the part of nature that they themselves circumscribe. I therefore
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imagine that the fully inclusive universe is a seamless whole that contains all
discernable differences, where none are intrinsic to the universe itself.
The above is a non-verifiable philosophical statement. An unfettered view
of the monistic universe is not possible for humans, inasmuch as our knowledge
is always based on significant distinctions of one kind or another. Experien-
tially, we begin with highly selective images that comprise the foreground of
our attention. We can certainly extend our imaginations beyond these specific
gestalts by thinking logically about their content. But then, we become tied to
a thinking process that relies on distinctions of a different kind - namely, those
that elevate and reify the primitives and axioms of our logical construction. It
is this property of ourselves in relation to the universe as a whole that pre-
vents us from fully grasping it as a whole. The monistic universe has no capital
landmarks; and so, we do not have a language, and will never have a language
(mathematical or otherwise) to talk about it in its entirety. It’s as though we
can see images of many kinds on a broad universal canvas, but the unifying
canvas itself is not distinguishable in a way that makes it available in one piece
to our intellect. The existence of such a canvas is therefore an unobservable and
unprovable philosophical hypothesis. I nonetheless believe that it describes the
final nature of our own universe.
Framented Human Knowledge
It follows that those parts of the universe that we can intellectually grasp are
always fragmented and incomplete segments of the whole. Let these fragments
be represented by areas such as A, B, and C in fig. 1, where the boundaries that
separate one fragment from another are believed by us to be intrinsic separa-
tions. Important breakthroughs in our knowledge occur when, through some
insight, the boundary between two fragments is removed or made irrelevant. For
example, the boundary between A and B might be removed, making a larger
fragment AB. Our knowledge would then be more inclusive. The boundary,
which was previously seen to be an intrinsic difference between A and B, would
continue to be a discernable difference, but it would no longer be intrinsic. It
appears therefore that increasing inclusiveness and eliminating apparent intrin-
sic distinctions go hand in hand. Of course, the area AB would still be contained
within a wider boundary, but the knowledge represented by this union would
be more profound.
Furthermore, there will always be a wider boundary. However many bound-
aries are transcended by new insights, it is the nature of human knowledge that
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there will always be new absolutes to articulate any new perspective. Experien-
tially, a wider and more inclusive gestalt will always have a background that is
not in the picture. Logically, a wider and more inclusive formalism always be-
gins with newly proclaimed axioms and primitive terms that define the absolute
or intrinsic boundaries of the new perspective. Go¨del’s undecidability theorem
assures us that the new formalism, however general, cannot contain all of the
true theorems in a universe of any complexity. Therefore, our knowledge, either
experiential or formal, can never include the universe as a whole. Beyond this
purely epistemological point, my ontological belief goes a step further to main-
tain that our monistic universe has no absolute boundaries of its own, apart
from our inability to discover them.
Splitting the Whole
However satisfying or unsatisfying a monistic universe might be as a philo-
sophical premise, it cannot serve as the basis of a usable ontology. We cannot
launch an articulation of reality from a platform that is ineffable in principle.
To proceed, we must create some arbitrary boundaries. I therefore divide the
monistic universe into three categories: matter, form, and consciousness (see
fig. 2). These, I believe, are the most significant ontological divisions that can
usefully serve as a basis of human understanding. Penrose split the universe
up in a similar way[1]. In addition, the grouping of these ontological categories
in fig. 2 allows a further epistemological division between the subjective world
and the objective world. This is the Cartesian divide, and is essential to what
follows.
The objective world in fig. 2 is a combination of matter and form. This is a
part of the universe that is not directly accessible to our selves. The subjective
world in fig. 2 is a combination of form and consciousness. This is the part of the
universe that is directly accessible to our selves. Form is the common element.
It is the link that we conscious beings have to the material world around us.
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We have no direct knowledge of matter or the form that it takes; however, we
do have a direct knowledge of consciousness and the form that it takes. Our
basic epistemological assumption is that a correspondence can be established
between the form that matter takes, and the form that consciousness takes.
Matter, form, and consciousness are such primitive ontological ideas that it is
not possible to give them definitions independent of context. Like the primitives
of a logical system, their meaning can only be derived from the way that they are
used. However, an indication of intent is possible. I will say that consciousness
includes perceptions such as sight, sound, taste, etc., and emotions such as fear,
anger, and love, etc. I call these the elements of ‘pure consciousness’ when they
are experienced in isolation. More generally, consciousness takes on a variety
of forms when complex images and ideas are held in mind. It is through these
images and ideas that we strive to portray the properties of the objective world.
The early pre-conscious universe of cosmology consisted of matter in one
form or another. It does not make sense to imagine that the universe at that
time possessed form alone. There had to be something that assumed the many
forms that we study in cosmology, and I call that something matter. The
form that matter takes is the subject of all of the physical sciences. I will also
refer in this paper to pure matter, or formless matter, whose properties are not
expressible in any formally structured science. I cannot explain what I mean by
this until some further issues are clarified, and the idea is put to use in Part II.
The divisions in fig. 2 are arbitrary in the sense that they are unsupported
by the monistic universe itself. Nonetheless, they are virtually inevitable to any
notion of reality that acknowledges the existence of a world that lies beyond
our separate selves, and is common to our many selves. This necessitates the
recognition of two realms of reality, and a connecting link between them through
which we can transcend ourselves to find the universe we share.
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Subjective Formations
Beyond the emotions and bare sensations that pervade our lives, our experience
is populated with many highly developed images of the things that we find in
our subjective environment, such as tables, chairs, wine bottles, etc. These
images have their origin in ordinary perception. By logical extension, we also
constructed images of things that we do not (directly) experience, such as the
atoms and molecules that are assumed to make up those tables and chairs and
bottles of wine. Since these are not directly seen, they do not have their origin
in ordinary perception. Instead, constructed images like these are formed in
our imagination, in this case, in our scientific imagination. A third kind of
subjective experience is an idea. This is formed when we discover a relationship
between images and/or parts of images, or between constructed images and/or
their parts.
These three formations are not clearly distinct from one another. Most
images, and certainly those of the constructed variety, are permeated with ideas.
However, it will serve our purpose in the next section to distinguish between
things such as wine bottles (images), and their molecules and atoms (constructed
images), and the physical laws (ideas) that govern their behavior.
Epistemology out of Ontology
The relationship between these subjective formations and the ontological cate-
gories in fig. 2 is shown diagrammatically in fig. 3. Subjective images and ideas
are represented there by the three rectangles on the top row. Each is assumed to
correspond to something equivalent to itself in the objective world, where these
objective things and relationships (bottom row) are joined to their subjective
counterparts by double lines called rules of correspondence. We are the ones
who make the rules of correspondence, by virtue of the relationship that we
assume exists between the objective world and our introspections about it[2].
They connect the form that consciousness takes with the presumed form that
matter takes.
Thus, I believe that our subjective concept of a bottle of wine (i.e., the
cross-hatched rectangle at the top-left in fig. 3) corresponds to some such thing
in the objective world (i.e., the cross-hatched rectangle at the bottom-left).
I also believe that the subjective concept of an atom (i.e., the broken-cross-
hatched rectangle at the top-center) corresponds to something having those
same formal properties in the real world (i.e., the broken-cross-hatched rectangle
5
AA
AA
AA
AA
AA
AA
AA
AA
AA
AA
AA
AA
objective objective
things relationships
images ideas
subjective subjective
Rules of 
Correspondence
matter
consciousness
Figure 3
at the bottom-center). And I believe that our idea of momentum conservation
(i.e., the gray rectangle at the top-right) corresponds to a law of nature (the gray
rectangle at the bottom-right). The space on the top-right in fig. 3 is intended
to represent pure (formless) consciousness, and the space on the bottom-left is
pure (formless) matter.
My subjective image of a wine bottle might be an experience in black and
white, or it might include a colorful label. However, it is only the formal features
of any image (e.g., its shape) that can be set into correspondence with the
objective thing. All of the characteristics of pure consciousness that Galileo
would have called “secondary qualities” (e.g., its color), have no meaning in the
objective world.
Adequacy
The subjective world in fig. 2 is not intended to be that of any particular indi-
vidual. Individuals are not important here. If no conscious individuals existed,
then of course subjectivity would not exist. But we split the universe into three
parts, not 6 billion or more. Presumably there are as many images of a wine
bottle in the universe as there are conscious wine drinking individuals. Each of
these images will be given its own cross-hatched rectangle in fig. 3, and hope-
fully, each will correspond to an actual wine bottle in the objective universe. I
believe that each of the image/thing or idea/relationship pairs in fig. 3 repre-
sents an attempt on the part of the universe to understand itself. It is ironic
that a monistic universe should have trouble with such a seemingly dualistic
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task - that of understanding itself. However, a failure to match pairs in fig.
3 does not constitute a contradiction on the part of the monistic universe, for
there is no reason why every subjective image that the universe creates should
correspond to something in the objective part of itself. No philosophical wine
drinker can be absolutely sure that the table, the chair, or the bottle he holds
is as objectively real as it appears. It is for this reason that we must continu-
ously test our subjective images and ideas for their adequacy in portraying an
objective world. Doing so is necessary to the long-term survival of a conscious
species, and the survival of such a species is necessary if the universe is ever to
understand itself.
Part II
The Ontological/Epistemological scheme in Part I will now be extended in two
ways. The first gives a more accurate account of the way that physicists in-
troduce matter into theoretical systems, and the second anticipates a possible
two-way involvement of consciousness with objective physical systems.
Rules of Stipulation
Newton’s physics may tell us how billiard balls behave, but it does not tell
us when and where to find billiard balls. Therefore, when defining a physical
system, a physicist must stipulate when and where material objects exist. He
quantifies the initial state of a billiard ball by giving its position, size, mass,
linear and angular momentum. The same kind of thing must be done when
specifying the initial state of an elementary particle in a quantum mechanical
system, but in this case, the rules of stipulation are different. The rules in this
case require one to fix the variables of a quantum mechanical state function.
For an electron that means giving its mass, charge, spin, and its probability
amplitude in configuration and momentum space.
The checkered rectangle on the top of fig. 4 represents any subjective image
or idea that includes a piece of matter. The objective world in that figure
contains the corresponding piece of matter in question, but we have unnaturally
divided that world into matter and form. Pure matter, represented by the black
square on the lower left, is therefore unnaturally separated from the form that it
takes, which is represented by the checkered rectangle in the lower center of the
figure. We repair this separation by connecting the two things with double lines
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representing natural associations. The reason for this diagrammatic separation
is given in the final paragraphs of this section.
The rules of stipulation are shown entering from the upper left in fig. 4. They
are intended to be parallel to the natural associations of the objective world;
but of course, they cannot terminate on anything to the left because they do not
complete an association of any kind. They only appear in current theories to
announce that a given state of matter exists at a certain time and place in our
theoretical system. The declaration itself must be stated in the formal language
of the theory, even though it represents missing information about pure matter.
Figure 4 therefore embodies an amendment to our epistemological/ontological
scheme that describes how matter is formally introduced into theoretical physics.
You might imagine that physics will one day have a theory that automat-
ically includes a complete state description of all particles at any time in the
history of the universe. That would seem to make rules of stipulation unneces-
sary. However, quantum mechanics can only predict probabilities. This means
that an extra-theoretical rule of stipulation will always be necessary after any
measurement in order to specify which of the possible results of the measurement
is realized. Therefore, rules of stipulation are necessary to say how quantum
mechanical particles survive measurement.
Here finally is the reason I give for the possibility of pure formless matter,
and the diagrammatic separation within the objective world in fig. 4. Formalists
and/or subjectivists might have objected to our ontological scheme from the
beginning, claiming that the ‘matter’ category in fig. 2 serves no useful purpose;
and that therefore, we who are confined to conscious awareness can get along
without it. Surely they will say that the ‘pure matter’ referred to in fig. 4
is a fiction. However, one lesson of quantum mechanics is that there is no
deterministic form that allows us to predict everything about matter that can
be measured. We can predict probabilities over ensembles of measurements,
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but we must resort to extra-theoretical rules of stipulation in order to specify
the results of individual measurements. This need for rules of stipulation is
a sign that ‘form’ fails to capture and embody every part of nature. Form
succeeds in capturing and embodying ensembles of measurements, but strangely
enough it fails at the level of the individual. Therefore, so long as we need rules
of stipulation, the natural associations that parallel the rules of stipulation
will serve the purpose of connecting that part of the objective world that can
manifest itself in a predictable form, with the part that cannot.
Of course, we might one day abandon quantum mechanics and go back to a
determinism that allows the results of a measurement to be known, or at least
knowable, in advance. Such a theory might conceivably be so powerful that all
rules of stipulation will be formally included in it. If that happens, then one
might reasonably conclude that a separate ontological category of pure matter is
not necessary. However, I do not believe that this will happen, for it is unlikely
that classical determinism can be convincingly revived. Therefore, as matters
now stand, matter stands apart from consciousness and form.
The Consciousness Connection
It is generally assumed that natural physiological processes within the body
give rise to consciousness, even though no one can say how or why something
like that should occur. Scientists generally believe that this consciousness is
epiphenomenal. That is, they believe that the body can create and influence
consciousness but that consciousness cannot influence the body. Accordingly,
the mind/body influence is believed to be a one-way street.
William James challenged the epiphenomenal idea, saying that conscious-
ness and matter must ‘interact’ with one another in order to satisfy the require-
ments of subjective evolution.[3] He accepts the psycho-physical parallelism of
von Neumann[4], which I interpret as the parallel relationship that exists be-
tween the various subjective and objective things in figs. 3 and 4. James says
that such a parallelism would not be possible if the subjective and the biological
states of a species did not actively engage one another during the time of their
evolution. In particular, subjective states must have a consequence for biolog-
ical states if there is to be Darwinian selection against a “wrong” subjective
construction. Without feedback of this kind, subjective imagery would have
developed independently of the underlying biology, so there would have been no
evolutionary mechanism to keep subjectivity on a parallel course with objective
reality. In these circumstances, the final emergence of a true parallelism would
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be a miracle. Therefore, if we are to reject miracles, and accept the idea that
subjectivity evolved along with everything else, and if we are to avoid a vacuous
Berkeleian idealism, then we must accept von Neumann’s psycho-physical par-
allelism and acknowledge its origins in a Jamesean-like evolutionary feedback.
It is for physics to discover the nature of this feedback and incorporate it into
physical theory1.
I accept and extend the argument from evolution in some recent papers,
and speculate as to how a “consciousness-to-matter” influence might have come
about. [5, 6]. But apart from the particular mechanism of this influence, or the
success of any particular speculation about it, we must provide for its episte-
mological possibility. The scheme in fig. 3 does not allow such an influence to
take place in either direction. It portrays the objective world as a self-contained
automaton that makes no authentic connection to the conscious world, except
for rules of correspondence that may or may not work. A further modification
of fig. 3 is therefore required.
Imagine that the brick-faced rectangle in the objective world of fig. 5 rep-
resents the body of a person who we call “Harry”, and who we assume has
a conscious life. In a monistic universe, Harry’s consciousness would not be
artificially separated from his body; so his consciousness is related to his objec-
tive body in fig. 5 through natural stipulations, represented by the double line
that comes into the figure from the lower right. This does not terminate on
anything on its right because Harry’s associated consciousness is not included
in the diagram. It is my belief that the stipulated influence goes both ways.
Harry’s objective body exerts an influence on his consciousness (again, not in
the diagram), and his consciousness exerts an influence on his objective body,
as per the argument of William James. The mind/body interaction occurs here.
The brick-faced rectangle on top in fig. 5 represents an image of Harry’s
body in the mind of an external investigator who is giving serious thought to
Harry’s body and Harry’s experiences. The consciousness that the investigator
associates with Harry’s body is represented by the small white square on the
upper right, which is also in the mind of the investigator. Therefore, the upper
brick-faced rectangle plus the white square constitute the investigator’s model
of Harry’s mind & body. The model cannot show an intrinsic connection be-
tween these two things, so they are joined instead by biconscious associations
1The psycho-physical parallelism of von Neumann resembles the pre-established harmony of
Leibniz. For Leibniz, this harmony of correspondences between subjectivity and objectivity
is indeed a miracle that is arranged by God. However, I say that it is a result of natural
‘monistic’ processes that find their way into human consciousness through the evolutionary
mechanisms of natural selection.
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that connect specific parts of Harry’s (theoretical) physiology to specific kinds
of consciousness. These associations are “biconscious” because they paste to-
gether two alien things that are in the mind of the investigator: (1) parts of his
physiological model, with (2) elements from his pure conscious awareness.
For instance, if the investigator believes that the color ‘red’ is associated with
neurological events at a point in Harry’s prefrontal cortex, then he will make
a biconscious association that goes from the prefrontal cortex of his physical
model (top-center in fig. 5) to his own concept of pure red consciousness (top-
right). An arranged wedding of red-with-brain is necessary because redness
cannot be included in a formal theory of the kind entertained by theoretical
physics, or theoretical physiology. This reflects a separation between form and
consciousness that occurs within the subjective world. Biconscious associations
are intended to run parallel to the natural stipulations entering the objective
world in fig. 5, fulfilling the requirements of von Neumann’s psycho-physical
parallelism. In the least, they parallel the one-way (epiphenomenal) influence
of physiology on psychic states; but they also parallel the proposed two-way
influence.
Super Theory
If a biconscious association is verified, it will be an empirical relationship that
cannot be integrated into theoretical physics as that science is now practiced
and understood. That’s because physical (or physiological) variables and psy-
chological states are not commensurable. Physiological variables are connected
to the objective world via vertical rules of correspondence; whereas psychological
states exist in another part of the subjective world that is related to theoreti-
cal physiology via horizontal biconscious associations. Of course, psychological
states might some day be expressed as psychological variables that are related
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in a definite way to physiological variables; however, relationships like that do
not presently exist. At the present state of our scientific understanding, con-
sciousness can only be joined to physiology through biconscious associations;
and this means that the connection cannot be organic.
It is possible in principle to find a theory of consciousness concerning relation-
ships between psychological states. Presumably, such a theory would employ
psychological variables that represent states of consciousness such as ‘redness’.
These variables would then be related to their intended psychic states via rules
of correspondence, not by biconscious associations2. A theory of consciousness
would therefore employ horizontal rules of correspondence that go from a theo-
retical construction like the upper brick-faced rectangle in fig. 5, to the conscious
state that it represents like the white square in fig. 5.
Now imagine a super theory that combines our hypothetical theory of con-
sciousness with physics. That would be a non-trivial unification of the two
theoretical systems that establishes a functional relationship between their vari-
ables. Super theory would therefore require both vertical and horizontal rules
of correspondence. It should be possible to reduce such a theory to: (1) a
physics part that uses physical variables only, (2) a psychological part that uses
psychological variables only, and (3) a part that establishes the functional re-
lationship between the two kinds of variables. The latter would give us formal
representations of the biconscious associations.
This would allow us to derive biconscious associations from a wider theoret-
ical framework, and that would give us the only logical ‘explanation’ of their
existence that we could ever expect. When Planck discovered his radiation law
between intensity and wave length, no one concluded that wavelength thereby
‘caused’ intensity, or that intensity ‘caused’ wave length, or that anything at
all was ‘explained’ by this empirical formula. It was not until Einstein’s pho-
ton theory provided a logical context for Planck’s formula that it was possible
to believe that it was thereby explained. Only then could a causal pathway
be derived from the basic theory to the Planck formula. Similarly, the dis-
covery of biconscious associations should not lead one to conclude that certain
physiological configurations ‘cause’ psychological states, or that psychological
states ‘cause’ physiological configurations, or that anything at all is thereby
‘explained’. Explanations and causal pathways will exist only if a wider theory
such as the above super theory allows one to derive the biconscious associations
2Correspondences are much stronger than associations. A psychic state can only be loosely
associated with a physiological configuration, whereas it can be set into full correspondence
with a theoretical variable that is intended to represent it in some (now non-existent) theory.
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in question. This will be true independent of the possible one-way or two-way
influence of these associations.
QMod
Suppose that a modification of quantum mechanics is found that produces the
collapse of a state function, and embodies physical mechanism that fully ex-
plains the evolution of von Neumann’s psycho-physical parallelism. I will call
such a modified theory QMod. If furthermore, the physiological site of this
modification is also the site of a subjective experience that does not have an in-
teractive influence on QMod, then it would seem that an epiphenomenal theory
of consciousness is again indicated. In other words, if QMod can account for a
state reduction and the psycho-physical parallelism in a self consistent and self
contained way without making explicit use of conscious states, then conscious-
ness would again appear to be a non-participant as it has been since the time of
Newton. However, QMod suffers the same disadvantage as any epiphenomenal
theory. It may be able to explain the workings of a material system without
the help of consciousness, but it cannot explain the co-appearance of conscious-
ness itself. Only a super theory can hope to explain the conscious states that
are associated with a material system. If that happens, if a super theory were
to prove successful, then consciousness and matter would become partners in
our understanding of nature, and an epiphenomenal interpretation would lose
all significance. In the end, epiphenomenalism remains an impoverished way of
looking at QMod or any purely mechanical system that is (tentatively) at the
forefront of theoretical construction.
A super theory of the kind described above is far beyond anything that is
currently possible, and may never be realized at all. Therefore, we should not
try to explain consciousness at this point. Instead, we should concentrate on
more limited objectives such as discovering the material circumstances in which
consciousness appears, and finding the biconscious associations that chronicle
the evolution of the psycho-physical parallelism. The latter is what the author
attempts to do in refs. 5 and 6.
Incompleteness and a TOE
When physicists speak about a Theory of Everything (TOE), they are not con-
cerned about including pure consciousness or formless matter into some grand
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theoretical scheme. They are only concerned with those things that are con-
tained within the ‘form’ part of the universe (i.e., the overlapping subjective
and objective worlds in fig. 3 that are joined with rules of correspondence.)
Presumably, such a TOE would cover the physical and biological sciences, eco-
nomics, sociology, and behavioral psychology, as well as all other ‘departments’
of objective knowledge. Many physicists believe that physics already includes
all of this knowledge in principle. I take this to mean that they believe that the
laws of physics can be put into an axiomatic form such that all objective laws or
relationships that are found in nature and in human affairs are included as the-
orems. I do not believe this to be possible. One obvious objection comes from
Go¨del’s undecidability theorem, which tells us that no finite set of axioms can
successfully derive all true theorems in a complex universe containing discrete
variables.
Certainly a TOE of the kind envisioned by physicists can be closely ap-
proached, even if it is never fully realized. Further unification in physics is
surely possible, and is the source of great motivation in such areas as string the-
ory. But human knowledge is essentially fragmented and incomplete as has been
said. However inclusive our understanding of nature, it will always be contained
within a boundary that excludes something else. In particular, pure conscious-
ness and formless matter are excluded in the kind of TOE that is pursued in
physics.
The super theory postulated above represents an even wider theoretical aspi-
ration - one that breaks through the bounds of the Cartesian divide between the
objective and the subjective worlds. It imagines a formalism that significantly
includes variables from both worlds, a feat that may never be realized. But even
if something like this is achieved, it will surely be bounded in such a way as to
exclude some other part of reality. Again, Go¨del’s undecidability theorem places
limitations on a formalism of any complexity that contains discrete variables;
and that stricture applies to our super theory as well as the any unified theory
of physics. The theorem represents a purely formal limitation on any TOE or
super TOE.
But more than that, we know that super theory excludes formless matter.
As previously explained, matter must be introduced into physics by stipulation
because of the quantum mechanical unpredictability of many of its numerical
values upon measurement. This means that no formal theory, however broad,
can include that part of reality. The measured “eigenvalues” of matter will
always have to be stipulated extra-theoretically so long as quantum uncertainty
is integral to physics.
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The Choices
In the best of all worlds, we humans would be able to fully comprehend the
monistic universe. However, I do not believe that this is possible for mortals
of this world. We can certainly talk about a monistic universe and speculate
about some of its holistic properties as we have done in this paper. But it is
not possible for us to put any particular thing (e.g., a wine bottle) into a full
monistic context. That’s because the universe is not circumscribed by intrinsic
boundaries that allow us to comprehend it. To get a handle on wine bottles
and their like, we are forced to introduce arbitrary boundaries that are useful
for that purpose.
The boundaries we introduced appear in figs. 2 and 3. They first divide the
universe into three ontological categories, and then split it into two epistemo-
logical parts. One of these parts includes that which we conscious beings know
to exist, and the other is that which we can only imagine exists. This division
of reality has a demonstrated utility, for it has served as a basis for accumulated
knowledge since the early seventeenth century. At the time, Descartes’ separa-
tion of mind and body was put to use in Galileo’s distinction between primary
and secondary qualities. Without this distinction, science as well as most other
fields of knowledge would not have advanced much beyond their medieval state.
There are certainly other choices that could be made. We might try to limit
ourselves to a purely subjective ontology, as positivists are prone to do; or, we
might claim that there is no significant separation between the subjective world
and the objective world, as some realists are prone to say. Both of these choices
attempt to mend the Cartesian divide as though the monistic universe is fully
available to our intellects. However, I do not think it is available in this way.
Perhaps the super theory, if it were realized, would suggest another way of
splitting up the universe. Because its rules of correspondence seem to ignore
the Cartesian divide by radiating in both horizontal and vertical directions,
super theory might suggest novel ontological and/or epistemological ways of
introducing distinctions into a monistic universe. That is certainly a possibility,
although it is not one that can be seriously entertained in the absence of a
well-defined super theory. My belief is that the boundaries in fig. 2 will survive
in any case. The separation between that part of the universe that we directly
know (i.e., the subjective) and the part that we can only imagine (i.e., the
objective) is much too fundamental an epistemological distinction to be cast
aside. Descartes is likely to prevail at the epistemological level no matter what
happens. Furthermore, the ontological distinction between pure consciousness
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and the form that it takes is hard to deny, not to mention the need to recognize
the existence of formless matter that is likely to remain outside of any theoretical
system. It is for these reasons that I believe that the categories and divisions
in fig. 2 are, and will continue to be, a practical starting point for any scientific
ontology and epistemology.
Our theories can only be related to something else by means of either rules
of correspondence, or rules of stipulation, or biconscious associations. I have
not made a point of this, but even the subjective relationships between our
images and our constructed images are established by rules of correspondence.
For instance, only a rule of correspondence can connect a theoretically con-
structed meter stick with the visual image of a meter stick that we experience
in the laboratory3. This is the original meaning of a rule of correspondence
introduced by Margenau (ref. 2), for whom direct experience is the ultimate
reference for any theoretical activity. In such a purely subjective context, von
Neumann’s psycho-physical parallelism can only point to the similarity that ex-
ists between our images and our theoretical constructions, and this creates a
problem. James’s evolutionary logic could not have begun by mediating be-
tween images and constructions alone, for there is no reason why either of these
should have existed prior to a time of their Darwinian emergence. They would
have served no purpose prior to that time. Therefore, subjective evolution could
not have begun within a purely subjective ontology. It could not have gotten
started without an external taskmaster that makes ‘realistic’ survival demands
of some sort on the evolving subjective states.
Copenhagen
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics embraces a subjective
philosophy, for it is claimed that we can no longer assume the existence of an
objective world. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is often cited as the reason
for this confinement to subjectivity. That principle tells us that there is some-
thing incomprehensible about nature because we cannot express the theoretical
state of a physical system in terms of classical variables to any degree of preci-
sion. We are forced instead to introduce probability as an intrinsic property of
the system. It is this rather strange feature of quantum mechanics that is said
3Constructed images of meter sticks not only include atomic or molecular models, but they
also include the elongated rectangles that we drawn on a blackboard to help solve problems in
kinematics. They include any cognitive attempt to represent something by abstracting from
it, or by elaborating upon it.
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to refute the idea of ‘objectivity’. However, it only refutes the idea of ‘classical
objectivity’.
From the beginning of this paper I have accepted that there is something
incomprehensible about nature. I believe that we humans can only go so far
in understanding the whole. But that has not prevented me from positing the
existence of an objective world, which “lies beyond our separate selves, and is
common to our many selves”. Nor does it prevent me from creating theoretical
models that are consistently related via rules of correspondence to something
that I believe to have similar formal properties in the objective world. To this
end, one need only accept intrinsic probability as a primitive variable in quantum
mechanical systems. It is clear, therefore, that Copenhagen physicists were not
forced to give up the objective world. They chose to do so, citing the demise of
classical objectivity as their reason.
If quantum mechanics tells us anything that is epistemologically novel, it is
that we will always need “rules of stipulation” to specify the state of a particle
that survives quantum measurement. These are extra-theoretical statements
that specify the actual measured values of intrinsic probability distributions.
A Copenhagen theorist would say that these stipulations are the principal ev-
idence of the claimed incomprehensibility of nature. I agree, but I would put
it differently. I cite these rules as evidence that there is a part of the objective
world (namely, pure-formless matter) that cannot be included in our theoretical
system. Only the ‘form’ that matter takes can be theoretically included. Rules
of stipulation therefore point to a part of nature that we cannot describe. They
do not say that there is no other part of nature.
And finally, as stated in the previous section, a completely subjective ontol-
ogy cannot give an evolutionary account of its own emergence. There is no place
for bare subjectivity to begin. It would have to be born whole. Consciousness
cannot emerge in bits and pieces, without another (external) reality to mediate
the process - selecting pieces that fit into a survival pattern of the species, and
discarding pieces that don’t fit. Evolution implies building piece by piece in
this way, and biological evolution requires an unforgiving environment to be
the womb of this process. Psychological evolution requires no less. With the
Copenhagen approach, as with all subjectivist philosophies, subjective states
lack an adversarial environment of this kind to rub against. And this implies
the miraculous emergence of a full-blown and fully consistent psychic life, or
possibly, a more gradual unfolding of serendipitous match-making between the
bits and pieces of psychic life.
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Revealing Universals
For one reason or another, I believe that we will never have a fully complete
theory of everything. It is probably an insight like this that has led Post Mod-
ernists and others to abandon the quest for a common universal knowledge and
a common universal understanding, choosing instead to go down a separatist
path. If human knowledge is fragmented and incomplete, these philosophers
invite you to choose an incomplete fragment that best fits your temperament,
and become a partisan of your own truth and your own reality. Not only is
this advice drearily contentious, but it doesn’t follow. It is true that any reality
we choose will be an incomplete fragment of the whole. But not all fragments
are equal. There is a highly principled choice between broad-based fragments
that reveal universals, and those fragments that are narrowly provincial and/or
merely self-serving. Only the broadest principles of unification can bring us
close to the common canvas that underlies all of our diverse human experiences.
We may never apprehend that canvas in an absolute sense, but the closer we
approach it, the greater is our reward. Those insights that are most inclusive
and least dependent on intrinsic difference are those that will bring us the great-
est intellectual and esthetic appreciation of things. Not only do they lead away
from partisan disputation, but they stress the universals that most nearly and
most beautifully reflect the underlying harmony of our universe.
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